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Abstract. Grover’s search algorithm gives a quantum attack against block ciphers by
searching for a key that matches a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This attack
uses O(
√
N) calls to the cipher to search a key space of size N . Previous work in the
specific case of AES derived the full gate cost by analyzing quantum circuits for the cipher,
but focused on minimizing the number of qubits.
In contrast, we study the cost of quantum key search attacks under a depth restriction
and introduce techniques that reduce the oracle depth, even if it requires more qubits. As
cases in point, we design quantum circuits for the block ciphers AES and LowMC. Our
circuits give a lower overall attack cost in both the gate count and depth-times-width cost
models. In NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization process, security categories
are defined based on the concrete cost of quantum key search against AES. We present
new, lower cost estimates for each category, so our work has immediate implications for
the security assessment of post-quantum cryptography.
As part of this work, we release Q# implementations of the full Grover oracle for AES-128,
-192, -256 and for the three LowMC instantiations used in Picnic, including unit tests and
code to reproduce our quantum resource estimates. To the best of our knowledge, these are
the first two such full implementations and automatic resource estimations.
Keywords: Quantum cryptanalysis, Grover’s algorithm, AES, LowMC, post-quantum
cryptography, Q# implementation.
1 Introduction
The prospect of a large-scale, cryptographically relevant quantum computer has prompted
increased scrutiny of the post-quantum security of our cryptographic primitives. Shor’s algorithm
for factoring and computing discrete logarithms introduced in [Sho94] and [Sho97] will completely
break public-key schemes such as RSA, ECDSA and ECDH. But symmetric schemes such as block
ciphers and hash functions are widely considered post-quantum secure. The only caveat thus far
is a security reduction due to key search or pre-image attacks with Grover’s algorithm [Gro96]. As
Grover’s algorithm only provides at most a square root speedup, the rule of thumb is to simply
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double the cipher’s key size to make it post-quantum secure. Such conventional wisdom reflects
the asymptotic behavior and only gives a rough idea of the security penalties that quantum
computers inflict on symmetric primitives. In particular, the cost of evaluating the Grover oracle
is often ignored.
In their call for proposals to the standardization of post-quantum cryptography [NIS16],
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) proposes security categories for
post-quantum public-key schemes such as key encapsulation and digital signatures. The categories
are defined by the cost of quantum algorithms for exhaustive key search on the block cipher AES
and collision search for the hash function SHA-3, and measure the attack cost in the number of
quantum gates. Because the gate count of Grover’s algorithm increases with parallelization, they
impose a total upper bound on the depth of a quantum circuit, called MAXDEPTH, and account for
this in the gate counts. There is no bound on width. An algorithm meets the requirements of a
specific security category if the best known attack uses more resources (gates) than are needed
to solve the reference problem. Hence, a concrete and meaningful definition of these security
categories depends on precise resource estimates of the Grover oracle for key search on AES.
Security categories 1, 3 and 5 correspond to key recovery against AES-128, AES-192 and
AES-256, respectively. The NIST proposal derives gate cost estimates from the concrete, gate-level
descriptions of the AES oracle by Grassl, Langenberg, Roetteler and Steinwandt [GLRS16]. Grassl
et al. aim to minimize the circuit width, i.e. the number of qubits needed.
Prior work. Since the publication of [GLRS16], other works have studied quantum circuits for
AES, the AES Grover oracle and its use in Grover’s algorithm. Almazrooie, Samsudin, Abdullah
and Mutter [ASAM18] improve the quantum circuit for AES-128. As in [GLRS16], the focus is on
minimizing the number of qubits. The improvements are a slight reduction in the total number of
Toffoli gates and the number of qubits by using a wider binary field inversion circuit that saves
one multiplication. Kim, Han and Jeong [KHJ18] discuss time-space trade-offs for key search on
block ciphers in general and use AES as an example. They discuss NIST’s MAXDEPTH parameter
and hence study parallelization strategies for Grover’s algorithm to address the depth constraint.
They take the Toffoli gate depth as the relevant metric for the MAXDEPTH bound arguing that it is
a conservative approximation.
Recently, independent and concurrent to parts of this work, Langenberg, Pham and Stein-
wandt [LPS19] developed quantum circuits for AES that demonstrate significant improvements
over those presented in [GLRS16] and [ASAM18]. The main source of optimization is a different
S-box design derived from work by Boyar and Peralta in [BP10] and [BP12], which greatly reduces
the number of Toffoli gates in the S-box as well as its Toffoli depth. Another improvement is that
fewer ancilla qubits are required for the AES key expansion. Again, this work aligns with the
objectives in [GLRS16] to keep the number of qubits small.
Bonnetain et al. [BNS19] study the post-quantum security of AES within a new framework
for classical and quantum structured search. The work cites [GLRS16] for deducing concrete gate
counts for reduced-round attacks.
Our contributions. We present implementations of the full Grover oracle for key search on AES
and LowMC in Q# [SGT+18], including full implementations of the block ciphers themselves. In
contrast to previous work [GLRS16], [ASAM18] and [LPS19], having a concrete implementation
allows us to get more precise, flexible and automatic estimates of the resources required to compute
these operations. It also allows us to unit test our circuits, to make sure that the implementations
are correct.
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The source code will be released5 under a free license to allow independent verification of our
results, further investigation of different trade-offs and cost models and re-costing as the Q#
compiler improves and as automatic optimization software becomes available. We hope that it
can serve as a useful starting point for cryptanalytic work to assess the post-quantum security of
other schemes.
We review the literature on the parallelization of Grover’s algorithm ([BBHT98], [Zal99],
[GR03], [KHJ18]) to explore the cost of attacking AES and LowMC in the presence of a bound
on the total depth, such as MAXDEPTH proposed by NIST. We conclude that using parallelization
by dividing the search space is advantageous. We also give a rigorous justification for the number
of plaintext-ciphertext blocks needed in Grover’s oracle in the context of parallelization. Smaller
values than those proposed by Grassl et al. [GLRS16] are sufficient, as is also pointed out by
Langenberg et al. [LPS19].
Our quantum circuit optimization approach differs from those in the previous literature
[GLRS16], [ASAM18] and [LPS19] in that our implementations do not aim for the lowest possible
number of qubits. Instead, we designed them to minimize the gate-count and depth-times-width
cost metrics for quantum circuits under a depth constraint. The gate-count metric is relevant for
defining the NIST security categories and the depth-times-width cost metric is a more realistic
measure of quantum resources when quantum error correction is deployed. Favoring lower depth
at the cost of a slightly larger width in the oracle circuit leads to costs that are smaller in both
metrics than for the circuits presented in [GLRS16], [ASAM18] and [LPS19]. Grover’s algorithm
does not parallelize well, meaning that minimizing depth rather than width is crucial to make the
most out of the available depth.
To the best of our knowledge, our work results in the most shallow quantum implementation
of AES proposed so far, and the first ever for LowMC.
We chose to also implement LowMC to provide an example of a quantum circuit for another
block cipher. It is used in the Picnic signature scheme ([CDG+17], [ZCD+17]), a round-2 candidate
in the NIST standardization process. Thus, our implementation can contribute to more precise
cost estimates for attacks on Picnic and the assessment of its post-quantum security.
We present our results for quantum key search on AES in the context of the NIST post-
quantum cryptography standardization process and derive new and lower cost estimates for
the definition of the NIST security strength categories. We see a consistent gate cost reduction
between 11 and 13 bits, making it easier for submitters to claim a certain quantum security
category.
2 Finding a block cipher key with Grover’s algorithm
Given plaintext-ciphertext pairs created by encrypting a small number of messages under a block
cipher, Grover’s quantum search algorithm [Gro96] can be used to find the secret key [YI00].
This section provides some preliminaries on Grover’s algorithm, how it can be applied to the key
search problem and how it parallelizes under depth constraints.
2.1 Grover’s algorithm
Grover’s algorithm [Gro96] searches through a space of N elements; for simplicity, we restrict
to N = 2k right away and label elements by their indices in {0, 1}k. The algorithm works
with a superposition |ψ〉 = 2−k/2∑x∈{0,1}k |x〉 of all indices, held in a register of k qubits. It
makes use of an operator Uf for evaluating a Boolean function f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} that marks
5 A public repository will be available after the internal code release process has been finalized.
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solutions to the search problem, i.e. f(x) = 1 if and only if the element corresponding to x is a
solution. When applying the Grover oracle Uf to a state |x〉 |y〉 for a single qubit |y〉, it acts as
|x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 in the computational basis. When |y〉 is in the state |ϕ〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2,
then this action can be written as |x〉 |ϕ〉 7→ (−1)f(x) |x〉 |ϕ〉. This means that the oracle applies a
phase shift to exactly the solution indices.
The algorithm first prepares the state |ψ〉 |ϕ〉 with |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 as above. It then repeatedly
applies the so-called Grover iteration
G = (2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − I)Uf ,
an operator that consists of the oracle Uf followed by the operator 2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − I, which can be
viewed as an inversion about the mean amplitude. Each iteration can be visualized as a rotation
of the state vector in the plane spanned by two orthogonal vectors: the superposition of all indices
corresponding to solutions and non-solutions, respectively. The operator G rotates the vector by
a constant angle towards the superposition of solution indices. Let 1 ≤M ≤ N be the number of
solutions and let 0 < θ ≤ pi/2 such that sin2(θ) = M/N . Note that if M  N , then sin(θ) is very
small and θ ≈ sin(θ) = √M/N .
When measuring the first k qubits after j > 0 iterations of G, the success probability p(j) for
obtaining one of the solutions is p(j) = sin2((2j + 1)θ) [BBHT98], which is close to 1 for j ≈ pi4θ .
Hence, after
⌊
pi
4
√
N
M
⌋
iterations, measurement yields a solution with overwhelming probability of
at least 1− MN .
Grover’s algorithm is optimal in the sense that any quantum search algorithm needs at least
Ω(
√
N) oracle queries to solve the problem [BBHT98]. In [Zal99], Zalka shows that for any
number of oracle queries, Grover’s algorithm gives the largest probability to find a solution.
2.2 Key search for a block cipher
Let C be a block cipher with block length n and key length k; for a key K ∈ {0, 1}k denote
by CK(m) ∈ {0, 1}n the encryption of message block m ∈ {0, 1}n under the key K. Given r
plaintext-ciphertext pairs (mi, ci) with ci = CK(mi), we aim to apply Grover’s algorithm to find
the unknown key K [YI00]. The Boolean function f for the Grover oracle takes a key K as input,
and is defined as
f(K) =
{
1, if CK(mi) = ci for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
0, otherwise.
Possibly, there exist other keys than K that encrypt the known plaintexts to the same
ciphertexts. We call such keys spurious keys. If their number is known to be, say M − 1, the
M -solution version of Grover’s algorithm has the same probability of measuring each spurious
key as measuring the correct K.
Spurious keys. We start by determining the probability that a single message encrypts to the
same ciphertext under two different keys, for which we make the usual heuristic assumptions about
the block cipher C. We assume that under a fixed key K, the map {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n,m 7→ CK(m)
is a pseudo-random permutation; and under a fixed message block m, the map {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}n,K 7→ CK(m) is a pseudo-random function. Now let K be the correct key, i.e. the
one that was used for the encryption. It follows that for a single message block of length n,
PrK 6=K′ (CK(m) = CK′(m)) = 2−n.
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This probability becomes smaller when the equality condition is extended to multiple blocks.
Given r distinct messages m1, . . . ,mr ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
p = PrK 6=K′ ((CK(m1), . . . , CK(mr)) = (CK′(m1), . . . , CK′(mr))) = 2−rn. (1)
Since the number of keys different from K is 2k − 1, we expect the number of spurious keys for
an r-block message to be (2k − 1)2−rn. Choosing r such that this quantity is very small ensures
with high probability that there is a unique key and we can parameterize Grover’s algorithm for
a single solution.
Remark 1. Grassl et al. [GLRS16, §3.1] work with a similar argument. They take the probability
over pairs (K ′,K ′′) of keys with K ′ 6= K ′′. Since there are 22k − 2k such pairs, they conclude that
about (22k − 2k)2−rn satisfy the above condition that the ciphertexts coincide on all r blocks.
But this also counts pairs of keys for which the ciphertexts match each other, but do not match
the images under the correct K. Thus, using the number of pairs overestimates the number of
spurious keys and hence the number r of message blocks needed to ensure a unique key.
Based on the above heuristic assumptions, one can determine the probability for a specific
number of spurious keys. Let X be the random variable whose value is the number of spurious
keys for a given set of r message blocks and a given key K. Then, X is distributed according to a
binomial distribution:
Pr(X = t) =
(
2k − 1
t
)
pt(1− p)2k−1−t,
where p = 2−rn. We use the Poisson limit theorem to conclude that this is approximately a
Poisson distribution with
Pr(X = t) ≈ e− 2
k−1
2rn
(2k − 1)t(2−rn)t
t!
≈ e−2k−rn 2
t(k−rn)
t!
. (2)
The probability that K is the unique key consistent with the r plaintext-ciphertext pairs is
Pr(X = 0) ≈ e−2k−rn . Thus we can choose r such that rn is slightly larger than k; rn = k + 10
gives Pr(X = 0) ≈ 0.999. In a block cipher where k = b · n is a multiple of n, taking r = b+ 1
will give the unique key K with probability at least 1− 2−n, which is negligibly close to 1 for
typical block sizes. If rn < k, then K is almost certainly not unique. Even rn = k − 3 gives less
than a 1% chance of a unique key. Hence, r must be at least dk/ne.
The case k = rn, when the total message length is equal to the key length, remains interesting
if one aims to minimize the number of qubits. The probability for a unique K is Pr(X = 0) ≈
1/e ≈ 0.3679, and the probability of exactly one spurious key is the same. Kim et al. [KHJ18,
Equation (7)] describe the success probability after a certain number of Grover iterations when
the number of spurious keys is unknown. The optimal number of iterations gives a maximum
success probability of 0.556, making it likely that the first attempt will not find the correct key
and one must repeat the algorithm.
Depth constraints for cryptanalysis. In this work, we assume that any quantum adversary
is bounded by a constraint on its total depth for running a quantum circuit. In its call for
proposals to the post-quantum cryptography standardization effort [NIS16], NIST introduces the
parameter MAXDEPTH as such a bound and suggests that reasonable values6 are between 240 and
6 Suggested MAXDEPTH values are justified by assumptions about the total available time and speed of
each gate. The limit 296 is given as “the approximate number of gates that atomic scale qubits with
speed of light propagation times could perform in a millennium” [NIS16]. An adversary could only run
a higher-depth circuit if they were able to use smaller qubits, faster propagation, or had more available
time.
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296. Whenever an algorithm’s overall depth exceeds this bound, parallelization becomes necessary.
We do assume that MAXDEPTH constitutes a hard upper bound on the total depth of a quantum
attack, including possible repetitions of a Grover instance.
We consider it reasonable to expect that the overall attack strategy is guaranteed to return a
solution with high probability close to 1 within the given depth bound. E.g., a success probability
of 1/2 for a Grover instance to find the correct key requires multiple runs to increase the overall
probability closer to 1. These runs, either sequentially or in parallel, need to be taken into account
for determining the overall cost and must respect the depth limit. While this setting is our main
focus, it can be adequate to allow and cost a quantum algorithm with a success probability
noticeably smaller than 1. Where not given in this paper, the corresponding analysis can be
derived in a straightforward manner.
Repeated measurements. It is shown by Boyer et al. [BBHT98] that instead of iterating⌊
pi
4
√
N
M
⌋
times, the expected number of iterations needed to find a solution is smaller if we
stop early after a fixed number j and repeat the algorithm until it succeeds. In this case, one
expects j/p(j) iterations, with a minimum of roughly 0.690
√
N/M expected iterations when
measuring and restarting after 0.583
√
N/M iterations. But this observation is only useful when
it is possible to run the search procedure many times. In cryptanalysis, the situation is typically
different. In light of the above assumption of having a depth bound and the goal of achieving high
success probability, a repeating strategy requiring on the average a small number of iterations is
undesirable if the variance of the number of necessary iterations is high. The above optimal value
of 0.583
√
N/M sequential quantum iterations before measuring a candidate solution identified by
Boyer et al. [BBHT98] means that, if the first measurement fails and we must repeat the partial
search, we end up using at least 1.166
√
N/M Grover iterations, exceeding pi4
√
N/M .
In general, for an integer m such that the depth limit allows a total of mj iterations, we can
decide whether to repeat a j-fold iteration instance of Grover’s algorithm m times or to use mj
iterations in one instance. The former succeeds with probability 1− (1− p(j))m, and the latter
with probability p(mj) = sin2((2mj+ 1)θ). It can be shown by induction that, if 0 < φ < pi/(2m),
then 1− sin2(mφ) ≤ (1− sin2(φ))m for all m ≥ 1; with φ = (2j + 1)θ and the observation that
φ  θ it follows, that to reach a fixed probability, we are better off using more consecutive
quantum iterations than measuring and repeating.
Remark 2. While for some cryptanalytic applications, it is important to find the correct key, for
others, any key that matches the plaintext-ciphertext pairs can be sufficient. For example, the
Picnic signature scheme ([CDG+17], [ZCD+17]) uses a block cipher C and encrypts a message
m to c, and (m, c) is the public key. The signature is a zero-knowledge proof that the signer
knows a secret key K such that CK(m) = c. Any other key K
′ with CK′(m) = c produces a valid
signature for the original public key. Thus, to forge signatures, a spurious key works just as well.
However, since in general, the number of spurious keys is unknown, Grover’s algorithm needs
to be adjusted for example as in [BBHT98, §4] or by running a quantum counting algorithm
first [BBHT98, §5]. This requires repeated runs of various Grover instances. As argued above
for the measure-and-repeat approach, under a total depth limitation, this reduces the success
probability.
2.3 Parallelization
There are different ways to parallelize Grover’s algorithm. Kim, Han, and Jeong [KHJ18] describe
two, which they denote as inner and outer parallelization. Outer parallelization runs multiple
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instances of the full algorithm in parallel. Only one instance must succeed, allowing us to reduce
the necessary success probability, and hence number of iterations, for all. Inner parallelization
divides the search space into disjoint subsets and assigns each subset to a parallel machine. Each
machine’s search space is smaller, so the number of necessary iterations shrinks.
Zalka [Zal99] concludes that in both cases, one only obtains a factor
√
S gain in the number
of Grover iterations when working with S parallel Grover oracles, and that this is asymptotically
optimal. Compared to many classical algorithms, this is an inefficient parallelization, since we must
increase the width by a factor of S to reduce the depth by a factor of
√
S. Both methods avoid any
communication, quantum or classical, during the Grover iterations. They require communication
at the beginning, to distribute the plaintext-ciphertext pairs to each machine and to delegate the
search space for inner parallelization, and communication at the end to collect the measured keys
and decide which one, if any, is the true key. The next section discusses why our setting favours
inner parallelization.
Advantages of inner parallelization. Consider S parallel machines that we run for j iterations,
using the notation of §2.1, and a unique key. For a single machine, the success probability is
p(j) = sin2 ((2j + 1)θ). Using outer parallelization, the probability that at least one machine
recovers the correct key is pS(j) = 1− (1− p(j))S . We hope to gain a factor
√
S in the number
of iterations, so instead of iterating
⌊
pi
4θ
⌋
times, we run each machine for jS =
⌊
pi
4θ
√
S
⌋
iterations.
Considering some small values of S, we get S = 1 : p1(j1) ≈ 1, S = 2 : p2(j2) ≈ 0.961 and
S = 3 : p3(j3) ≈ 0.945. As S gets larger, we use a series expansion to find that
pS(jS) ≈ 1−
(
1− pi
2
4S
+O
(
1
S2
))S
S→∞−−−−→ 1− e−pi
2
4 ≈ 0.915. (3)
This means that by simply increasing S, it is not possible to gain a factor
√
S in the number of
iterations if one aims for a success probability close to 1. In contrast, with inner parallelization, the
correct key lies in the search space of exactly one machine. With jS iterations, this machine has
near certainty of measuring the correct key, while other machines are guaranteed not to measure
the correct key. Overall, we have near-certainty of finding the correct key. Inner parallelization
thus achieves a higher success probability with the same number S of parallel instances and the
same number of iterations.
Another advantage of inner parallelization is that dividing the search space separates any
spurious keys into different subsets and reduces the search problem to finding a unique key. This
allows us to reduce the number r of message blocks in the Grover oracle and was already observed
by Kim, Han, and Jeong [KHJ18] in the context of measure-and-repeat methods. In fact, the
correct key lies in exactly one subset of the search space. If the spurious keys fall into different
subsets, the respective machines measure spurious keys, which can be discarded classically after
measurement with access to the appropriate number of plaintext-ciphertext pair. The only relevant
question is whether there is a spurious key in the correct key’s subset of size 2k/S. The probability
for this is
SKP(k, n, r, S) =
∞∑
t=1
Pr(X = t) = 1− e− 2
k−rn
S , (4)
using Equation (2) with 2k replaced by 2k/S. If k = rn, this probability is roughly 1/S when
S gets larger. In general, high parallelization makes spurious keys irrelevant, and the Grover
oracle can simply use the smallest r such that SKP(k, n, r, S) is still small enough, i.e. less than a
desired bound.
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3 Quantum circuit design
Quantum computation is usually described in the quantum circuit model. This section describes
our interpretation of quantum circuits, methods and criteria for quantum circuit design, and cost
models to estimate quantum resources.
3.1 Assumptions about the fault-tolerant gate set and architecture
The quantum circuits we are concerned with in this paper operate on qubits. The circuits
themselves are composed of so-called Clifford+T gates, which is a commonly used universal fault-
tolerant gate set exposed by several families of quantum error-correcting codes. The primitive gates
consist of single-qubit Clifford gates, controlled-NOT (CNOT) gates, T gates, and measurements.
We make the standard assumption of full parallelism, meaning that a quantum circuit can
apply any number of gates simultaneously so long as these gates act on disjoint sets of qubits
[BBG+13,GR03].
All quantum circuits for AES and LowMC described in this paper were designed, tested, and
costed in the Q# programming language [SGT+18], which supports all assumptions discussed
here. We adopt the computational model presented in [JS19]. The Q# compiler allows us to
compute circuit depth automatically by moving gates around through a circuit if the qubits it
acts on were previously idle. In particular, this means that the depth of two circuits applied
in series may be less than the sum of the individual depths of each circuit. The Q# language
allows the circuit to allocate ancilla qubits as needed, which adds new qubits initialized to |0〉.
If an ancilla is returned to the state |0〉 after it has been operated on, the circuit can release it.
Such a qubit is no longer entangled with the state used for computation and the circuit can now
maintain or measure it.
Grover’s algorithm is a far-future quantum algorithm, making it difficult to decide on the
right cost for each gate. Previous work assumed that T gates constitute the main cost ([GLRS16],
[ASAM18], [LPS19]). They are exceptionally expensive for a surface code [FMMC12]; however,
for a future error-correcting code, T gates may be transversal and cheap while a different gate
may be expensive. Thus, we present costs for both counting T gates only, and costing all gates
equally. For most of the circuits, these concerns do not change the optimal design.
We ignore all concerns of layout and communication costs for the Grover oracle circuit. Though
making this assumption is unrealistic for a surface code, where qubits can only interact with
neighboring ones, other codes may not have these issues. A single oracle circuit uses relatively
few logical qubits (< 220), so these costs are unlikely to dominate. This allows us to compare our
work with previous proposals, which also ignore these costs. This also implies that uncontrolled
swaps are free, since the classical controller can simply track such swaps and rearrange where it
applies subsequent gates.
While previous work on quantum circuits for AES such as [GLRS16], [ASAM18] and [LPS19]
mainly uses Toffoli gates, we use AND gates instead. A quantum AND gate has the same
functionality as a Toffoli gate, except the target qubit is assumed to be in the state |0〉, rather
than an arbitrary state. We use a combination 7 of the circuit by Selinger [Sel13] and the one by
Gidney [Gid18] to express the AND gate in terms of Clifford and T gates, see §C. This circuit
uses 4 T gates and 11 Clifford gates in T-depth 1 and total depth 8. It uses one ancilla qubit
which it immediately releases, while its adjoint circuit is slightly smaller.
7 We thank Mathias Soeken for providing the implementation of the AND gate circuit.
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3.2 Automated resource estimation and unit tests
One incentive for producing full implementations of the Grover oracle and its components is
to obtain precise resource estimates automatically and directly from the circuit descriptions.
Another incentive is to test the circuits for correctness and to compare results on classical inputs
against existing classical software implementations that are known (or believed) to be correct. Yet
quantum circuits are in general not testable, since they rely on hardware yet to be constructed.
To partially address this issue, the Q# compiler can classically simulate a subset of quantum
circuits, enabling partial test coverage. We thus designed our circuits such that this tool can fully
classically simulate them, by using X, CNOT, CCNOT, SWAP, and AND gates only, together
with measurements (denoted throughout as M “gates”). This approach limits the design space
since we cannot use true quantum methods within the oracle. Yet, it is worthwhile to implement
components that are testable and can be fully simulated to increase confidence in the validity of
resource estimates deduced from such implementations.
As part of the development process, we first implemented AES (resp. LowMC) in Python3,
and tested the resulting code against the AES implementation in PyCryptodome 3.8.2 [PyC19]
(resp. the C++ reference implementation in [Low19]). Then, we proceeded to write our Q#
implementations (running on the Dotnet Core version 2.1.507, using the Microsoft Quantum
Development Kit version 0.7.1905.3109), and tested these against our Python3 implementations,
by making use of the IQ# interface (see [Mic19b],[Mic19a]. For the Q# simulator to run, we are
required to use the Microsoft QDK standard library’s Toffoli gate for evaluating both Toffoli and
AND gates, which results in deeper than necessary circuits. We also have to explicitly SWAP
values across wires, which costs 3 CNOT gates, rather than simply keeping track of the necessary
free rewiring. Hence, to mitigate these effects, our functions admit a Boolean flag indicating
whether the code is being run as part of a unit test by the simulator, or as part of a cost estimate.
In the latter case, Toffoli and AND gate designs are automatically replaced by shallower ones,
and SWAP instructions are disregarded as free (after manually checking that this does not allow
for incompatible circuit optimizations). All numbers reporting the total width of a circuit include
the initial number of qubits plus the maximal number of temporarily allocated auxiliary qubits
within the Q# function. For numbers describing the total depth, all gates such as Clifford gates,
CNOT and T gates as well as measurements are assigned a depth of 1.
The AND and Toffoli gate designs we chose use measurements, hence CNOT, 1-qubit Clifford,
measurement and depth counts are probabilistic. The Q# Toffoli simulator does not currently
support PRNG seeding for de-randomizing the measurements, 8 which means that estimating
differently sized circuits with the same or similar depth (or re-estimating the same circuit multiple
times) may result in slightly different numbers. We also note that the compiler is currently unable
to optimize a given circuit by, e.g., searching through small circuit variations that may result in
functionally the same operation at a smaller cost (say by allowing better use of the circuit area).
3.3 Reversible circuits for linear maps
Linear maps f : Fn2 → Fm2 for varying dimensions n and m are essential building blocks of AES and
LowMC. In general, such a map f , expressed as multiplication by a constant matrix Mf ∈ Fm×n2 ,
can be implemented as a reversible circuit on n input wires and m additional output wires
(initialized to |0〉), by using an adequate sequence of CNOT gates: if the (i, j)-th coefficient of
Mf is 1, we set a CNOT gate targeting the i-th output wire, controlled on the j-th input wire.
Yet, if a linear map g : Fn2 → Fn2 is invertible, one can reversibly compute it in-place on the
input wires via a PLU decomposition of Mg, Mg = P · L · U [TB97, Lecture 21]. The lower- and
8 https://github.com/microsoft/qsharp-runtime/issues/30, last visited on 2019-08-24.
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upper-triangular components L and U of the decomposition can be implemented as described
above by using the appropriate CNOT gates, while the final permutation P does not require any
quantum gates and instead, is realized by appropriately keeping track of the necessary rewiring.
An example of a linear map decomposed in both ways is shown in Figure 1. While rewiring is not
easily supported in Q#, the same effect can be obtained by defining a custom REWIRE operation
that computes an in-place swap of any two wires when testing an implementation, and that can
be disabled when costing it. We note that such decompositions are not generally unique, but
it is not clear whether sparser decompositions can be consistently obtained with any particular
technique. For our implementations, we adopt the PLU decomposition algorithm from [TB97,
Algorithm 21.1], as implemented in SageMath 8.1 [S+17].
M =

1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1
 =

1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
 ·

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
 ·

1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 = P · L · U
(a) Invertible linear transformation M and its PLU decomposition.
|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|d〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|d〉
|a+ c+ d〉
|a+ c〉
|b〉
|a+ d〉
(b) Naive circuit computing M .
|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|d〉
|a+ c+ d〉
|b〉
|a+ d〉
|a+ c〉
(c) In-place implementation of M .
Fig. 1: Alternative circuits implementing the same linear transformation M : F42 → F42, by using
the two strategies described in §3.3. Both are direct implementations, and could potentially
be reduced in size by automatic means as in [MSR+19], [MSC+19], [GKMR14] and [ZC19], or
manually. Figure 1b is wider and has a larger gate count, but is shallower, than Figure 1c.
3.4 Cost metrics for quantum circuits
For a meaningful cost analysis, we assume that an adversary has fixed constraints on its total
available resources, as well as a specific cost metric they wish to minimize. Without such limits,
we might conclude that AES-128 could be broken in under a second using 2128 machines, or
broken using only a few thousand qubits but a billion-year runtime. Most importantly, we assume
a total depth limit Dmax as explained in §2.2.
In this paper, we use the two cost metrics that are considered by Jaques and Schanck in [JS19].
The first is the total number of gates, the G-cost. It assumes non-volatile (“passive”) quantum
memory, and therefore it models circuits that incur some cost with every gate, but no cost is
incurred in time units during which a qubit is not operated on.
The second cost metric is the product of circuit depth and width, the DW -cost. This is a more
realistic cost model when quantum error correction is necessary. It assumes a volatile (“active”)
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quantum memory, which incurs some cost to correct errors on every qubit in each time step, i.e.
each layer of the total circuit depth. In this cost model, a released ancilla qubit would not require
error correction, and the cost to correct it could be omitted. But we assume an efficient strategy
for qubit allocation that avoids long idle periods for released qubits and thus choose to ignore
this subtlety. Instead, we simply cost the maximum width at any point in the oracle, times its
total depth. For both cost metrics, we can choose to count only T -gates towards gate count and
depth, or count all gates equally.
The cost of Grover’s algorithm. As in §2.1, let the search space have size N = 2k. Suppose
we use an oracle G such that a single Grover iteration costs GG gates, has depth GD, and uses GW
qubits. Let S = 2s be the number of parallel machines that are used with the inner parallelization
method by dividing the search space in S disjoint parts (see §2.3). In order to achieve a certain
success probability p, the required number of iterations can be deduced from p ≤ sin2((2j + 1)θ)
which yields jp =
⌈
(arcsin
(√
p
)
/θ − 1)/2⌉ ≈ arcsin(√p)/2 ·√N/S. Let cp = arcsin(√p)/2, then
the total depth of a jp-fold Grover iteration is
D = jpGD ≈ cp
√
N/S · GD = cp2
k−s
2 GD cycles. (5)
Note that for p ≈ 1, we have c1 such that c1 = pi4 . Each of the S machines uses jpGG ≈
cp
√
N/S · GG = cp2 k−s2 GG gates, which means that the total G-cost over all machines is
G = S · jpGG ≈ cp
√
N · S · GG = cp2
k+s
2 GG gates. (6)
Finally, the total width is W = S · GW = 2sGW qubits, which leads to a DW -cost
DW ≈ cp
√
N · S · GDGW = cp2
k+s
2 GDGW qubit-cycles. (7)
These cost expressions show that minimizing the number S = 2s of parallel machines minimizes
both G-cost and DW -cost. Thus, under fixed limits on depth, width, and the number of gates,
an adversary’s best course of action is to use the entire depth budget and parallelize as little as
possible. Under this premise, the depth limit fully determines the optimal attack strategy for a
given Grover oracle. Limits on width or the number of gates simply become binary feasibility
criteria and are either too tight and the adversary cannot finish the attack, or one of the limits is
loose. If one resource limit is loose, we may be able to modify the oracle to use this resource to
reduce depth, lowering the overall cost.
Optimizing the oracle under a depth limit. Grover’s full algorithm parallelizes so badly
that it is generally preferable to parallelize within the oracle circuit. Reducing its depth allows
more iterations within the depth limit, thus reducing the necessary parallelization.
Let Dmax be a fixed depth limit. Given the depth GD of the oracle, we are able to run
jmax = bDmax/GDc Grover iterations of the oracle G. For a target success probability p, we obtain
the number S of parallel instances to achieve this probability in the instance whose key space
partition contains the key from p ≤ sin2((2jmax + 1)
√
S/N) as
S =
⌈
N · arcsin2(√p)
(2 · bDmax/GDc+ 1)2
⌉
≈ c2p2k
G2D
D2max
. (8)
Using this in Equation (6) gives a total gate count of
G = c2p2
kGDGG
Dmax
gates. (9)
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It follows that for two oracle circuits G and F, the total G-cost is lower for G if and only if
GDGG < FDFG. That is, we wish to minimize the product GDGG. Similarly, the total DW -cost
under the depth constraint is
DW = c2p2
kG
2
DGW
Dmax
qubit-cycles. (10)
Here, we wish to minimize G2DGW of the oracle circuit to minimize total DW -cost.
Comparing parallel Grover search to classical search. In the computational model
of [JS19], each quantum gate is interpreted as some computation done by a classical controller.
For certain parameter settings, these controllers may find the key more efficiently through a
classical search. Assume, this is done with a brute force algorithm, which simply iterates through
all potential keys and checks if they are correct. Let C be the classical gate cost to test a single
key. Then for a search space of size N = 2k, the total cost for the brute force attack to achieve
success probability p is p2kC. Comparing this cost to the gate cost for Grover’s algorithm in
Equation (6), we conclude that if we use more than (pC/(cpGG))
22k parallel machines, Grover’s
algorithm is slower and more costly than a classical search on the same hardware.
Since the Grover oracle G includes a reversible evaluation of the block cipher and quantum
computation of a function is likely more costly than its classical counterpart, we may assume
that the classical gate cost C is smaller than the quantum gate cost GG of the Grover oracle,
i.e. C ≤ GG. It holds that p/cp < 1.45, so (pC/(cpGG))2 < 2.11 and for p = 1, we have
(pC/(cpGG))
2 = 16/pi2 · C2/G2G ≈ 1.62 · C2/G2G ≤ 1.62. Depending on the actual cost ratio, this
bound may be in a meaningful range.
Communication cost to assemble the results in parallel Grover. We briefly discuss the
communication cost incurred by communicating a found solution from one of the machines in a
large network of parallel computers to a central processor. Each machine measures a candidate
key after a specified number of Grover iterations. The classical controller then checks this key
against a small number of given plaintext-ciphertext pairs in order to determine whether it is a
valid solution. If the key is correct, it is communicated to a central processor.
If the number of machines is small, the central processor simply queries each machine
sequentially for the correct key. For a large number of machines, we instead assume they are
connected in a binary tree structure with one machine designated as the root. The central
processor queries this one for the final result. If it has measured a correct key, it is returned,
otherwise it asynchronously queries two other machines which form the roots of equally-sized
sub-trees, in which the same process is repeated. For S machines this requires S requests, but
only lgS must be sequential.
We assume that the spatial arrangement of the S machines is in a two-dimensional plane in
form of an H tree. Furthermore, it can be assumed that communication between machines is via
classical channels with very small signal propagation times. The total distance any signal must
travel is proportional to the square root of the size of this tree, i.e.
√
S. Thus, the total time
to recover the final key is O(lgS) + cS
√
SGW cycles, where cS is a constant to account for the
relationship between signal propagation speed and quantum gate times. For large S, the O(lgS)
term is insignificant.
We assume that cS  1, meaning that these classical channels can propagate a signal across a
qubit-sized distance much faster than we can apply a gate to that qubit. This means the depth
of each Grover search will dwarf the communication costs so long as S ≤ 2k/2 cpGD
cS
√
GW
. If we use
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more machines than this, the communication costs dominate the depth. These costs increase with
S and thus S = 2k/2
cpGD
cS
√
GW
gives the minimum possible depth of
2
k
4
√
cpcSGD
√
GW cycles. (11)
Similar reasoning shows that a classical brute force search, which assembles its results in the
same way, has a minimum depth of 2
k
3 (GWCc
2
S/p
2)1/3. Thus, unless we can construct a three-
dimensional layout9, we cannot solve the search problem with quantum or classical computers
in depth less than Equation 11. For AES-128, 192 and 256 this implies minimum depths of
240.2cs, 2
56.2cs and 2
72.3cs, respectively. For LowMC-128, 192, and 256 the minimum depths are
respectively 241.1cs, 2
59.8cs and 2
76.4cs.
4 A quantum circuit for AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [DR99,DR01] is a block cipher standardized by NIST
in 2001. Using the notation from [DR99], AES is composed of an S-box, a Round function (with
subroutines ByteSub, ShiftRow, MixColumn, AddRoundKey; with the last round slightly differing
from the others), and a KeyExpansion function (with subroutines SubByte, RotByte). The S-box
corresponds to inversion in the finite field F256 ' F2[x]/(x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1) (with 0 7→ 0).
Three different instances of AES have been standardized, for key lengths of 128, 192 and 256
bits. Grassl et al. [GLRS16] describe their quantum circuit implementation of the S-box and
other components, resulting in a full description of all three instances of AES (but no testable
code has been released). Grassl et al. take care to reduce the number of ancilla qubits required,
i.e. reducing the circuit width as much as possible. The recent improvements by Langenberg et
al. [LPS19] build on the work by Grassl et al. with similar objectives.
In this section, we describe our implementation of AES in the quantum programming language
Q# [SGT+18]. Some of the components are taken from the description in [GLRS16], while others
are implemented independently, or ported from other sources. We take the circuit description
from [GLRS16] as the basis for our work and compare to the results in [LPS19]. In general, we
aim at reducing the depth of the AES circuit, while limitations on width are less important.
Width restrictions are not explicitly considered by the NIST call for proposals [NIS16, § 4.A.5].
The internal state of AES contains 128 bits, arranged in four 32-bit (or 4-byte) words. In
the rest of this section, when referring to a ‘word’, we intend a 4-byte word. In all tables below,
we denote by #CNOT, the number of CNOT gates, by #1qCliff the number of 1-qubit Clifford
gates, by #T the number of T gates, by #M the number of measurement operations and by
width the number of qubits.
4.1 S-box, ByteSub and SubByte
As mentioned above, the AES S-box comprises a transformation that inverts the input as an
element of F256, and maps 0 to 0. The S-box is the only source of T gates in a quantum circuit of
AES. On classical hardware, it can be implemented easily using a lookup-table. Yet, on a quantum
computer, this is not efficient (see [BGB+18], [LKS18] and [Gid19]). Alternatively, the inversion
can be computed either by using some variant of Euclid’s algorithm (taking care of the special
case of 0), or by applying Lagrange’s theorem and raising the input to the (|F×256| − 1)th power
(i.e. the 254th power), which incidentally also takes care of the 0 input. Grassl et al. [GLRS16]
9 A truly three-dimensional layout seems unlikely, though an adversary with the resources to build 264
quantum computers may also be able to launch them into orbit and assemble them into a sphere.
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suggest to use an Itoh-Tsujii inversion algorithm [IT88], following [ASR12], and compute all
required multiplications over F2[x]/(x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1). This idea had already been extensively
explored in the vast10 literature on hardware design for AES, and requires a different construction
of F256 to be most effective. Following this lead, we port the S-box circuit by Boyar and Peralta
from [BP12] to Q#. The specified linear program combining AND and XOR operations can be
easily expressed as a sequence of equivalent CNOT and AND operations (we could use T-depth-1
CCNOT gates [Sel13], but instead opt for overall cheaper T-depth-1 AND gates [Sel13,Gid18],
see §C). Cost estimates for the AES S-box can be found in Table 1. We compare to our own
Q# implementation of the S-box circuits from [GLRS16] and [LPS19]. ByteSub is a state-wide
parallel application of the S-box, requiring new output ancillas to store the result, while SubByte
is a similar word-wide application of the S-box.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
[GLRS16] S-box 8683 1028 3584 0 217 1692 44
[BP10] S-box 818 264 164 41 35 497 41
[BP12] S-box 654 184 136 34 6 101 137
Table 1: Comparison of our reconstruction of the original [GLRS16] S-box circuit with the one
from [BP10] as used in [LPS19] and the one in this work based on [BP12]. In our implementation
of [BP10] from [LPS19], we replace CCNOT gates with AND gates to allow a fairer comparison.
Remark 3. Langenberg et al. [LPS19] independently introduced a new AES quantum circuit design
using the S-box circuit proposed in [BP10]. They also present a ProjectQ [SHT18] implementation
of the S-box, albeit without unit tests. We ported their source code to Q#, tested and costed
it. For a fairer comparison, we replaced their CCNOT gates with the AND gate design that our
circuits use. Cost estimates can be found in Table 1. Overall, the [BP12] S-box leads to a more
cost effective circuit for our purposes in both the G-cost and DW -cost metrics, and hence we
did not proceed further in our analysis of costs using the [BP10] design. Note that the results
obtained here differ from the ones presented in [LPS19, §3.2]. This is due to the difference in
counting gates and depth. While [LPS19] counts Toffoli gates, the Q# resource estimator costs at
a lower level of T gates and also counts all gates needed to implement a Toffoli gate.
4.2 ShiftRow and RotByte
ShiftRow is a permutation on the full 128-bit AES state, happening across its four words [DR99,
§4.2.2]. As a permutation of qubits, it can be entirely encoded as rewiring. Like Grassl et
al. [GLRS16], we consider rewiring as free and do not include it in our cost estimates. Similarly,
RotByte is a circular left shift of a word by 8 bits, and can be implemented by appropriate
rewiring as well.
4.3 MixColumn
The operation MixColumn interprets each word in the state as a polynomial in F256[x]/(x4 + 1).
Each word is multiplied by a fixed polynomial c(x) [DR99, § 4.2.3]. Since the latter is coprime
10 E.g. see [Rij00], [SMTM01], [BP10], [BP+19], [JKL10], [NNT+10], [UHS+15], [RMTA18b], [RMTA18a],
[WSH+19].
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to x4 + 1, this operation can be seen as an invertible linear transformation, and hence can
be implemented in place by a PLU decomposition of a matrix in F32×322 . To simplify this
tedious operation, we use SageMath [S+17] code that performs the PLU decomposition, and
outputs equivalent Q# code. Note that [GLRS16] describes the same technique, while achieving
a significantly smaller design than the one we obtain (ref. Table 2), but we were not able to
reproduce these results. However, highly optimized, shallower circuits have been proposed in
the hardware design literature such as [JMPS17], [KLSW17], [BFI19], [EJMY18], [TP19]. Hence,
we chose to use one of those and experiment with a recent design by Maximov [Max19]. Both
circuits are costed independently in Table 2. Maximov’s circuit has a much lower depth, but it
only reduces the total depth, does not reduce the T-depth (which is already 0) and comes at
the cost of an increased width. Our experiments show that without a depth restriction, it seems
advantageous to use the in-place version to minimize both G-cost and DW -cost metrics, while for
a depth restricted setting, Maximov’s circuit seems better due to the square in the depth term in
Equation (10).
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
In-place MixColumn 1108 0 0 0 0 111 128
[Max19] MixColumn 1248 0 0 0 0 22 318
Table 2: Comparison of an in-place implementation of MixColumn (via PLU decomposition)
versus the recent shallow out-of-place design in [Max19].
4.4 AddRoundKey
AddRoundKey performs a bitwise XOR of a round key to the internal AES state and can be
realized with a parallel application of 128 CNOT gates, controlled on the round key qubits and
targeted on the state qubits. Grassl et al. [GLRS16] and Langenberg et al. [LPS19] use the same
approach.
4.5 KeyExpansion
Key expansion is one of the two sources of T gates in the design of AES, and hence might
have a strong impact on the overall efficiency of the circuit. A simple solution to implement
KeyExpansion consists of allocating enough ancilla qubits to store the full expanded key, including
all round keys. This option is easy to implement, and has relatively low depth, but clearly uses
more qubits than necessary. The authors of [GLRS16] propose an approach that caches only those
key bytes that require S-box evaluations, which amortizes the width cost.
Instead, we propose to minimize width by not requiring ancilla qubits at all. At the same
time, we are able to reduce the depth in comparison with the naive key expansion using ancilla
qubits for all key bits as described above.
Let |k〉0 denote the AES key consisting of Nk ∈ {4, 6, 8} key words and |k〉i the i-th set of Nk
consecutive round key words. The first such block |k〉1 can be computed in-place as shown in the
appropriately sized circuit in Figure 2. This circuit produces the i-th set of Nk key words from
the (i− 1)-th set. Note that for AES-128, these sets correspond to the actual round keys as the
key size is equal to the block size, for AES-192 and AES-256, each round key set generates more
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words than needed in a single round key. The full operation mapping |k〉i−1 7→ |k〉i is denoted by
KE. As for the two larger key sizes, each round only needs parts of these sets of round key words,
we specify KElj to denote the part of the operation KE that produces the words j . . . l of the
new set, disregarding other words. KElj can be used as part of the round strategy from §4.6 to
only compute as many words of the round key as necessary, resulting in an overall narrower and
shallower circuit. A comparison of this strategy and the naive KeyExpansion can be found in §B.
|k0〉i−1
|k1〉i−1
|k2〉i−1
|k3〉i−1 RotByte
l SubByte
RotByte†
RC |k0〉i
|k1〉i
|k2〉i
|k3〉i
(a) AES-128 in-place key expansion step producing the i-th round key.
|k0〉i−1
|k1〉i−1
|k2〉i−1
|k3〉i−1
|k4〉i−1
|k5〉i−1 RotByte
l SubByte
RotByte†
RC |k0〉i
|k1〉i
|k2〉i
|k3〉i
|k4〉i
|k5〉i
(b) AES-192 in-place key expansion step producing the i-th set of 6 round key words.
|k0〉i−1
|k1〉i−1
|k2〉i−1
|k3〉i−1
|k4〉i−1
|k5〉i−1
|k6〉i−1
|k7〉i−1 RotByte
l SubByte
RotByte†
RC
SubByte
|k0〉i
|k1〉i
|k2〉i
|k3〉i
|k4〉i
|k5〉i
|k6〉i
|k7〉i
(c) AES-256 in-place key expansion step producing the i-th set of 8 round key words.
Fig. 2: In-place AES key expansion for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, deriving the ith set of
Nk round key words from the (i− 1)th set. Each |kj〉i represents the jth word of |k〉i. SubByte
takes the input state on the top wire, and returns the output on the bottom wire, while l SubByte
takes inputs on the bottom wire, and returns outputs on the top. Dashed lines indicate that the
corresponding wire is not used in the l SubByte operation. RC represents the round constant
addition, which is implemented by applying X gates as appropriate.
Remark 4. In addition to improving the S-box circuit over [GLRS16], Langenberg et al. [LPS19,
§4] achieve significant savings by reducing the number of qubits and the depth of key expansion.
This is achieved by an improved scheduling of key expansion during AES encryption, namely by
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computing round key words only at the time they are required and un-computing them early.
While their method is based on the one in [GLRS16] using ancilla qubits for the round keys, our
approach works completely in place and reduces width and depth at the same time.
4.6 Round, FinalRound and full AES
To encrypt a message block using AES-128 (resp. -192, -256), we initially XOR the input message
with the first 4 words of the key, and then execute 10 (resp. 12, 14) rounds consisting of ByteSub,
ShiftRow, MixColumn (except in the final round) and AddRoundKey. The C-like pseudo-code
from [DR99, §4.4] is reported in simplified fashion in §A, Algorithm 1. The quantum circuits for
AES we propose follow the same blueprint with the exception that key expansion is interleaved
with the algorithm in such a way that the operations KElj only produce the key words that are
immediately required.
The resulting circuits are shown in Figures 3 and 4. For formatting reasons, we omit the
repeating round pattern, and only represent a subset of the full set of qubits used. In AES-128,
each round is identical until round 9. In AES-192 rounds 5, 8 and 11 use the same KE call and
order as round 2; rounds 6 and 9 do as round 3; rounds 7 and 10 do as round 4. In AES-256,
rounds 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 (resp. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13) use the same KE call and order as round 2 (resp. 3).
Cost estimates for the resulting AES encryption circuits can be found in Table 3. In contrast to
[GLRS16] and [LPS19], we aim to reduce circuit depth, hence un-computing of rounds is delayed
until the output ciphertext is produced. In order to allow easier testability and modularity, the
Round circuit is divided into two parts: a ForwardRound operator that computes the output
state but does not clean ancilla qubits, and its adjoint. For unit-testing Round in isolation, we
compose ForwardRound with its adjoint operator. For testing AES, we first run all ForwardRound
instances without ancilla cleaning, resulting in a similar ForwardAES operator, copy out the
ciphertext, and then undo the ForwardAES operation.
Table 3 presents results for the AES circuit for both versions of MixColumn, the in-place
implementation using a PLU decomposition as well as Maximov’s out-of-place, but lower depth
circuit. We keep both because, depending on the application one or the other is preferable. The
full depth corresponds to the value GD as in §3.4 and §2.3, while width corresponds to GW . While
for AES-128 and AES-192, GDGW is smaller for the in-place implementation, G
2
DGW is smaller for
Maximov’s circuit. Hence, §2.3 indicates that when optimizing the DW -cost metric with depth
restriction, Maximov’s circuit should be preferred. If there is no depth restriction, though, the
in-place design leads to a lower DW -cost.
4.7 T depth.
Every round of AES (as implemented in Figures 3 and 4) computes at least one layer of S-boxes as
part of ByteSub, which must later be uncomputed. We would thus expect the T-depth of n rounds
of AES to be 2n times the T-depth of the S-box. Instead, Table 3 shows smaller depths. We find
this effect when using both the AND circuit and the standard library’s CCNOT implementation,
which passes unit tests. To test if this is a bug, we used a placeholder S-box circuit which has
an arbitrary T-depth d and which the compiler cannot parallelize (see §D for the design). This
“dummy“ AES design had the expected T-depth of 2n · d. Thus we believe the Q# compiler found
non-trivial parallelization between components of the S-box and the surrounding circuit. This
provides a strong case for full explicit implementations of quantum cryptanalytic algorithms in
Q# or other languages that allow automatic resource estimates and optimizations; in our case
the T-depth of AES-256 is 25% less than naively expected.
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operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
AES-128 (in-place MC) 291150 83116 54400 13600 120 2827 1785
AES-192 (in-place MC) 328612 93160 60928 15232 120 2987 2105
AES-256 (in-place MC) 402878 114778 75072 18768 126 3353 2425
AES-128 (Maximov’s MC) 293730 83236 54400 13600 120 2094 2937
AES-192 (Maximov’s MC) 331752 93280 60928 15232 120 1879 3513
AES-256 (Maximov’s MC) 406288 114318 75072 18768 126 1955 4089
Table 3: Circuit cost estimates for the AES operator, using the [BP12] S-box and either an
in-place or Maximov’s [Max19] MixColumn design. A discussion of the apparently inconsistent
T-depth can be found in §4.7.
5 A quantum circuit for LowMC
LowMC [ARS+15,ARS+16] is a family of block ciphers aiming to result in low multiplicative
complexity circuits. Originally designed to reduce the high cost of binary multiplication in the
MPC and FHE scenarios, it has been adopted as a fundamental component by the Picnic signature
scheme (see [CDG+17] and [ZCD+17]) proposed for standardization as part of the NIST process
for standardizing post-quantum cryptography.
To achieve low multiplicative complexity, LowMC proposes an S-box layer of AND-depth
1, which contains a user-defined number of parallel 3-bit S-box computations. In general, any
instantiation of LowMC comprises a specific number of rounds, each consisting of calls to an
S-box layer, an affine transformation, and a round key addition. Key-scheduling can either be
precomputed or computed on the fly. In this work, we study the original LowMC design. This
results in a sub-optimal circuit, which can clearly be improved by porting the more recent
version from [DKP+19] instead. Even for the original LowMC, our work shows that the overhead
imposed by the cost of the Grover oracle is very small, in particular under the T-depth metric.
Since LowMC has the potential for being standardized as a component of Picnic, we deem it
appropriate to point out the differences in Grover oracle cost between different block ciphers and
that generalization from AES requires caution.
In this section we describe our Q# implementation of the LowMC instances used as part
of Picnic. In particular, Picnic proposes three parameter sets, with (key size,block size) ∈
{(128, 128), (192, 192), (256, 256)}.
5.1 S-box and S-boxLayer
The LowMC S-box can be naturally implemented using Toffoli (CCNOT) gates. In particular,
a simple in-place implementation with depth 5 (T-depth 3) is shown in Figure 5, alongside a
T-depth 1 out-of-place circuit, both of which were produced manually. Costs for both circuits
can be found in Table 4. We use the CCNOT implementation from [Sel13], which does not use
measurements. In the case of LowMC inside of Picnic, the full S-boxLayer consists of 10 parallel
S-boxes run on the 30 low order bits of the state.
5.2 LinearLayer, ConstantAddition and AffineLayer
LowMC applies an affine transformation called AffineLayer to the state at every round. It consists
of a matrix multiplication (LinearLayer) and the addition of a constant vector (ConstantAddi-
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|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|a+ bc〉
|a+ b+ ac〉
|a+ b+ c+ ab〉
(a) LowMC in-place S-box.
|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
|x〉
|y〉
|z〉
|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
|x+ a+ bc〉
|y + a+ b+ ac〉
|z + a+ b+ c+ ab〉
(b) LowMC T-depth 1 S-box.
Fig. 5: Alternative quantum circuit designs for the LowMC S-box. We note that the in-place
design does require ancilla qubits as part of the concrete CCNOT implementation.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
In-place S-box 50 6 21 0 3 23 7
Shallow S-box 60 6 21 0 1 11 13
Table 4: Cost estimates for a single LowMC S-box circuit, following the two designs proposed
in Figure 5. We note that the circuit size may seem different at first sight due to Figure 5 not
displaying the concrete CCNOT implementation.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
AffineLayer L1 R1 8093 60 0 0 0 2365 128
AffineLayer L3 R1 18080 90 0 0 0 5301 192
AffineLayer L5 R1 32714 137 0 0 0 8603 256
Table 5: Costs for in-place circuits implementing the first round (R1) AffineLayer transformation
for the three instantiations of LowMC used in Picnic.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
KeyExpansion L1 R1 8104 0 0 0 0 2438 128
KeyExpansion L3 R1 18242 0 0 0 0 4896 192
KeyExpansion L5 R1 32525 0 0 0 0 9358 256
Table 6: Costs for in-place circuits implementing the first round (R1) KeyExpansion operation
for the three instantiations of LowMC used in Picnic.
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tion). Both matrix and vector are different for every round and are predefined constants that
are populated pseudo-randomly. ConstantAddition can be implemented with the appropriate
application of X gates wherever the vector’s corresponding entry is a 1. In Picnic, for every round
and every parameter set, all LinearLayer matrices are invertible (due to LowMC’s specification
requirements), and hence the matrix multiplication can be implemented via a PLU decomposition.
Cost estimates for the first round affine transformation in LowMC as used in Picnic can be found
in Table 5.
5.3 KeyExpansion and KeyAddition
To generate the round keys, for each round, the LowMC key k is multiplied by a different key
derivation pseudo-random matrix. In round i, the matrix KMi is used to compute round key
rki = KMi · k. Again, for Picnic, just like the matrices used in the LinearLayer transformation,
all KMi are invertible. Hence, we can use a PLU decomposition again. Furthermore, to reduce
width of the circuit, rather than computing the ith round key rki as KMi · k, we compute it in
place from rki−1 as rki = KMi ·KM−1i−1 · rki−1 by generating the PLU decomposition of each
KMi ·KM−1i−1, sparing us unnecessary extra matrix multiplications or wires. We call this operation
KeyExpansion. KeyAddition is equivalent to AddRoundKey in AES, and is implemented the
same way. Cost estimates for the first round key expansion in LowMC as used in Picnic can be
found in Table 6.
5.4 Round and LowMC
A LowMC round consists of sequentially applying S-boxLayer, AffineLayer and KeyAddition to
the state. In our implementation, we also run KeyExpansion before AffineLayer. A full LowMC
encryption can be obtained by first adding the LowMC key k to the message, producing the
initial state, and then running the specified number of rounds on the latter. Costs of the resulting
encryption circuit are shown in Table 7.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
LowMC L1 689944 4932 8400 0 40 98699 991
LowMC L3 2271870 9398 12600 0 60 319317 1483
LowMC L5 5070324 14274 15960 0 76 693471 1915
Table 7: Costs for the full encryption circuit for LowMC as used in Picnic.
6 Grover oracles and key search resource estimates
Equipped with Q# implementations of the AES and LowMC encryption circuits, this section
describes the implementation of full Grover oracles for both block ciphers. Eventually, based on
the cost estimates obtained automatically from these Q# Grover oracles, we provide quantum
resource estimates for full key search attacks via Grover’s algorithm. Beyond comparing to
previous work, our emphasis is on evaluating algorithms that respect a total depth limit, for
which we consider the values for MAXDEPTH as proposed by NIST in [NIS16]. This necessarily
means that we must include parallelization, which we assume to use inner parallelization via
splitting up the search space, see §2.3.
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6.1 Grover oracles
As discussed in §2.2 and §2.3, we must determine the parameter r, the number of known plaintext-
ciphertext pairs that are required for a successful key-recovery attack. The Grover oracle encrypts
r plaintext blocks under the same candidate key and computes a Boolean value that encodes
whether all r resulting ciphertext blocks match the given classical results. Having a circuit for the
block cipher allows us to build the oracle for an arbitrary number r in a simple fashion by fanning
out the key qubits to the r instances and running the r block cipher circuits in parallel. Then a
comparison operation with the classical ciphertexts conditionally flips the result qubit and the
r encryptions are un-computed. Figure 6 shows the construction for AES and r = 2, using the
ForwardAES operation from §4.6.
|k〉0
|m1〉
|m2〉
|−〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
FwAES
FwAES
FwAES†
FwAES†
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
|k〉0
|m1〉
|m2〉
|−〉
Fig. 6: Grover oracle construction from AES using two message-ciphertext pairs. FwAES represents
the ForwardAES operator described in §4.6. The middle operator “=” compares the output of
AES with the provided ciphertexts and flips the target qubit if they are equal.
The required number of plaintext-ciphertext blocks. The explicit computation of the
probabilities in Equation (1) shows that it using r = 2 for AES-128, r = 2 for AES-192 and r = 3
for AES-256 will guarantee a unique key with overwhelming probability. The probabilities that
there are no spurious keys are 1− , where  < 2−128,  < 2−64 and  < 2−128, respectively. Grassl
et al. [GLRS16, § 3.1] used r = 3, r = 4 and r = 5, respectively. Hence, these values are too large
and the Grover oracle can work correctly with fewer full AES evaluations.
If one is content with a success probability lower than 1, it suffices to use r = dk/ne blocks of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In this case, it is enough to use r = 1 for AES-128, r = 2 for AES-192
and r = 2 for AES-256. Langenberg et al. [LPS19] also propose these values. As an example, if
we use r = 1 for AES-128, the probability of not having spurious keys is 1/e ≈ 0.368, which could
be a high enough chance for a successful attack in certain scenarios, e.g., when there is a strict
limit on the width of the attack circuit. Furthermore, when a large number of parallel machines
are used in an instance of the attack, as discussed in §2.3, even the value r = 1 can be enough in
order to guarantee with high probability that the relevant subset of the key space contains the
correct key as a unique solution.
The LowMC parameter sets we consider here all have k = n. Therefore, r = 2 plaintext-
ciphertext pairs are enough for all three sets (k ∈ {128, 192, 256}). Then, the probability that
the key is unique is 1− , where  < 2−k, i.e. this probability is negligibly close to 1. With high
parallelization, r = 1 is sufficient for a success probability very close to 1.
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Grover oracle cost for AES. Table 8 shows the resources needed for the full AES Grover
oracle for the relevant values of r ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Even without parallelization, more than 2 pairs are
never required for AES-128 and AES-192. The same holds for 4 or more pairs for AES-256.
Grover oracle cost for LowMC. The resources for our implementation of the full LowMC
Grover oracle for the relevant values of r ∈ {1, 2} are presented in Table 9. In any setting, we
never need more than r = 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
AES-128 oracle (IP MC, r = 1) 292313 84428 54908 13727 121 2816 1665
AES-192 oracle (IP MC, r = 1) 329697 94316 61436 15359 120 2978 1985
AES-256 oracle (IP MC, r = 1) 404139 116286 75580 18895 126 3353 2305
AES-128 oracle (IP MC, r = 2) 585051 169184 109820 27455 121 2815 3329
AES-192 oracle (IP MC, r = 2) 659727 188520 122876 30719 120 2981 3969
AES-256 oracle (IP MC, r = 2) 808071 231124 151164 37791 126 3356 4609
AES-256 oracle (IP MC, r = 3) 1212905 347766 226748 56687 126 3347 6913
AES-128 oracle (M’s MC, r = 1) 294863 84488 54908 13727 121 2086 2817
AES-192 oracle (M’s MC, r = 1) 332665 94092 61436 15359 120 1879 3393
AES-256 oracle (M’s MC, r = 1) 407667 116062 75580 18895 126 1951 3969
AES-128 oracle (M’s MC, r = 2) 589643 168288 109820 27455 121 2096 5633
AES-192 oracle (M’s MC, r = 2) 665899 188544 122876 30719 120 1890 6785
AES-256 oracle (M’s MC, r = 2) 815645 231712 151164 37791 126 1952 7937
AES-256 oracle (M’s MC, r = 3) 1223087 346290 226748 56687 126 1956 11905
Table 8: Cost estimates for the AES Grover oracle operator for r = 1, 2 and 3 plaintext-ciphertext
pairs. “IP MC” (resp. “M’s MC”) means the oracle uses an in-place (resp. Maximov’s [Max19])
MixColumn design.
6.2 Cost estimates for block cipher key search
Using the cost estimates for the AES and LowMC Grover oracles from §6.1, this section provides
cost estimates for full key search attacks on both block ciphers. For the sake of a direct comparison
to the previous results in [GLRS16] and [LPS19], we first ignore any limit on the depth and
present the same setting as in these works. Then, we provide cost estimates with imposed depth
limits and the consequential parallelization requirements.
Comparison to previous work. Table 10 shows cost estimates for a full run of Grover’s
algorithm when using
⌊
pi
4 2
k/2
⌋
iterations of the AES Grover operator without parallelization. We
only take into account the costs imposed by the oracle operator Uf (in the notation of §2.1) and
ignore the costs of the operator 2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − I. If the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs ensures a
unique key, this number of operations maximizes the success probability psucc to be negligibly
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operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
LowMC L1 oracle (r = 1) 690961 5917 8908 191 41 98709 1585
LowMC L3 oracle (r = 1) 2273397 10881 13364 286 61 319323 2377
LowMC L5 oracle (r = 1) 5072343 16209 16980 372 77 693477 3049
LowMC L1 oracle (r = 2) 1382143 11774 17820 362 41 98707 3169
LowMC L3 oracle (r = 2) 4547191 21783 26732 576 61 319329 4753
LowMC L5 oracle (r = 2) 10145281 32567 33964 783 77 693483 6097
Table 9: Cost estimates for the LowMC Grover oracle operator for r = 1 and 2 plaintext-ciphertext
pairs. LowMC parameter sets are as used in Picnic.
close to 1. For smaller values of r such as those proposed in [LPS19], the success probability is
given by the probability that the key is unique.
The G-cost is the total number of gates, which is the sum of the first three columns in the table,
corresponding to the numbers of 1-qubit Clifford and CNOT gates, T gates and measurements.
Table 10 shows that the G-cost is always better in our work when comparing values for the same
AES instance and the same value for r. The same holds for the DW -cost as we increase the width
by factors less than 4 and simultaneously reduce the depth by more than that.
Grassl et al. [GLRS16]
scheme #(1qCliff+CNOT) #T #M T-depth full depth width G-cost DW -cost psucc
AES-128 (r = 3) 1.55 · 286 1.19 · 286 0 1.06 · 280 1.16 · 281 2 953 1.37 · 287 1.67 · 292 ≈ 1
AES-192 (r = 4) 1.17 · 2119 1.81 · 2118 0 1.21 · 2112 1.33 · 2113 4 449 1.04 · 2120 1.44 · 2125 ≈ 1
AES-256 (r = 5) 1.83 · 2151 1.41 · 2151 0 1.44 · 2144 1.57 · 2145 6 681 1.62 · 2152 1.28 · 2158 ≈ 1
Langenberg et al. [LPS19]
AES-128 (r = 1) 1.46 · 282 1.47 · 281 0 1.44 · 277 1.39 · 279 865 1.10 · 283 1.17 · 289 ≈ 1/e
AES-192 (r = 2) 1.71 · 2115 1.68 · 2114 0 1.26 · 2109 1.23 · 2111 1 793 1.27 · 2116 1.08 · 2122 ≈ 1
AES-256 (r = 2) 1.03 · 2148 1.02 · 2147 0 1.66 · 2141 1.61 · 2143 2 465 1.54 · 2148 1.94 · 2154 ≈ 1/e
this work
AES-128 (IP MC, r = 1) 1.13 · 282 1.32 · 279 1.32 · 277 1.48 · 270 1.08 · 275 1665 1.33 · 282 1.76 · 285 ≈ 1/e
AES-128 (IP MC, r = 2) 1.13 · 283 1.32 · 280 1.32 · 278 1.48 · 270 1.08 · 275 3329 1.34 · 283 1.75 · 286 ≈ 1
AES-192 (IP MC, r = 2) 1.27 · 2115 1.47 · 2112 1.47 · 2110 1.47 · 2102 1.14 · 2107 3969 1.50 · 2115 1.11 · 2119 ≈ 1
AES-256 (IP MC, r = 2) 1.56 · 2147 1.81 · 2144 1.81 · 2142 1.55 · 2134 1.29 · 2139 4609 1.84 · 2147 1.45 · 2151 ≈ 1/e
AES-256 (IP MC, r = 3) 1.17 · 2148 1.36 · 2145 1.36 · 2143 1.55 · 2134 1.28 · 2139 6913 1.38 · 2148 1.08 · 2152 ≈ 1
Table 10: Comparison of cost estimates for Grover’s algorithm with
⌊
pi
4 2
k/2
⌋
AES oracle iterations
for attacks with high success probability, without a depth restriction. CNOT and 1-qubit Clifford
gate counts are added to allow easier comparison to the previous work from [GLRS16] and
[LPS19], who report both kinds of gates under “Clifford”. [LPS19] uses the S-box design from
[BP10]. “IP MC” means the oracle uses an in-place MixColumn design.
Table 11 shows cost estimates for LowMC in the same setting. Despite LowMC’s lower
multiplicative complexity and a relatively lower number of T gates, the large number of CNOT
gates leads to overall higher G-cost and DW -cost than AES, as we count all gates.
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scheme # CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width G-cost DW -cost psucc
LowMC L1 (r = 1) 1.04 · 283 1.13 · 276 1.71 · 276 1.17 · 271 1.01 · 269 1.18 · 280 1585 1.06 · 283 1.83 · 290 ≈ 1/e
LowMC L3 (r = 1) 1.70 · 2116 1.04 · 2109 1.28 · 2109 1.75 · 2103 1.50 · 2101 1.91 · 2113 2377 1.72 · 2116 1.11 · 2125 ≈ 1/e
LowMC L5 (r = 1) 1.90 · 2149 1.55 · 2141 1.63 · 2141 1.14 · 2136 1.89 · 2133 1.04 · 2147 3049 1.91 · 2149 1.55 · 2158 ≈ 1/e
LowMC L1 (r = 2) 1.04 · 284 1.13 · 277 1.71 · 277 1.11 · 272 1.01 · 269 1.18 · 280 3169 1.06 · 284 1.83 · 291 ≈ 1
LowMC L3 (r = 2) 1.70 · 2117 1.04 · 2110 1.28 · 2110 1.77 · 2104 1.50 · 2101 1.91 · 2113 4753 1.72 · 2117 1.11 · 2126 ≈ 1
LowMC L5 (r = 2) 1.90 · 2150 1.56 · 2142 1.63 · 2142 1.20 · 2137 1.89 · 2133 1.04 · 2147 6097 1.91 · 2150 1.55 · 2159 ≈ 1
Table 11: Cost estimates for Grover’s algorithm with
⌊
pi
4 2
k/2
⌋
LowMC oracle iterations for attacks
with high success probability, without a depth restriction.
Cost estimates under a depth limit. Tables 13 and 14 show cost estimates for running
Grover’s algorithm against AES and LowMC under a given depth limit. This restriction is
proposed in the NIST call for proposals for standardization of post-quantum cryptography [NIS16].
We use the notation and example values for MAXDEPTH from the call. Imposing a depth limit forces
the parallelization of Grover’s algorithm, which we assume uses inner parallelization, see §2.3.
The values in the table are determined as explained in §3.4. Given cost estimates GG, GD
and GW for the oracle circuit, we determine the maximal number of Grover iterations that can
be carried out within the MAXDEPTH limit. Then the required number S of parallel instances is
computed via Equation (8) and the G-cost and DW -cost follow from Equations (9) and (10).
The number r of plaintext-ciphertext pairs is the minimal value such that the probability SKP
for having spurious keys in the subset of the key space that holds the target key is less than 2−20.
The impact of imposing a depth limit on the key search algorithm can directly be seen by
comparing, for example Table 13 with Table 10 in the case of AES. Key search against AES-128
without depth limit has a G-cost of 1.34 · 283 gates and a DW -cost of 1.75 · 286 qubit-cycles. Now,
setting MAXDEPTH = 240 increases both the G-cost and the DW -cost by a factor of roughly 234
to 1.07 · 2117 gates and 1.76 · 2120 qubit-cycles. For MAXDEPTH = 264, the increase is by a factor
of roughly 210. We note that for MAXDEPTH = 296, key search on AES-128 does not require any
parallelization.
Implications for post-quantum security categories. The security strength categories 1, 3
and 5 in the NIST call for proposals [NIS16] are defined by the resources needed for key search on
AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256, respectively. For a cryptographic scheme to satisfy the security
requirement at a given level, the best known attack must take at least as many resources as key
search against the corresponding AES instance.
As guidance, NIST provides a table with gate cost estimates via a formula depending on
the depth bound MAXDEPTH. This formula is deduced as follows: assume that non-parallel Grover
search requires a depth of D = x · MAXDEPTH for some x ≥ 1 and the circuit has G gates. Then,
about x2 machines are needed that each run for a fraction 1/x of the time and use roughly G/x
gates in order for the quantum attack to fit within the depth budget given by MAXDEPTH while
attaining the same attack success probability. Hence, the total gate count for a parallelized Grover
search is roughly (G/x) · x2 = G ·D/MAXDEPTH. The cost formula reported in the NIST table
(also provided in Table 12 for reference) is deduced by using the values for G-cost and depth D
from Grassl et al. [GLRS16].
The above formula does not take into account that parallelization often allows us to reduce
the number of required plaintext-ciphertext pairs, resulting in a G-cost reduction for search
in each parallel Grover instance by a factor larger than x. Note also that [NIS16, Footnote 5]
mentions that using the formula for very small values of x (very large values of MAXDEPTH such
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that D/MAXDEPTH < 1, where no parallelization is required) underestimates the quantum security
of AES. This is the case for AES-128 with MAXDEPTH = 296.
In Table 12, we compare NIST’s numbers with our gate counts for parallel Grover search. Our
results for each specific setting incorporate the reduction of plaintext-ciphertext pairs through
parallelization, provide the correct cost if parallelization is not necessary and use improved circuit
designs. The table shows that for most situations, AES is less quantum secure than the NIST
estimates predict. For each category, we provide a very rough approximation formula that could
be used to replace NIST’s formula. We observe a consistent reduction in G-cost for quantum key
search by 11-13 bits.
Since NIST clearly defines its security categories 1, 3 and 5 based on the computational
resources required for key search on AES, the explicit gate counts should be lowered to account for
the best known attack. This would mean that it is now easier for submitters to claim equivalent
security, with the exception of category 1 with MAXDEPTH = 296. A possible consequence of our
work is that some of the NIST submissions might profit from slightly tweaking certain parameter
sets to allow more efficient implementations, while at the same time satisfying the (now weaker)
requirements for their intended security category.
Remark 5. If NIST replaces its explicit gate cost estimates for AES with the ones obtained in
this work, key recovery against the instances of LowMC we implemented requires at least as
many gates as key recovery against AES with the same key size, as can be seen from the G-cost
results for the full depth in Table 14.
On the other hand, the same results show that these LowMC instances do not meet the explicit
gate count requirements for the original NIST post-quantum security categories. For example,
LowMC L1 can be broken with an attack having G-cost 1.25 · 2123 in depth MAXDEPTH = 240,
while the original NIST bound in category 1 requires a scheme to not be broken by an attack
using less than 2130 gates. In all settings considered here, a LowMC key can be found with a
slightly smaller G-cost than NIST’s original estimates for AES, again with the exception when no
parallelization is needed. The margin is relatively small.
Yet, a final conclusion about the relative security between LowMC and AES should be deferred
until quantum circuits for LowMC have been optimized to a similar extent as the ones for AES.
7 Future work
This work’s main focus is on exploring the setting proposed by NIST where quantum attacks are lim-
ited by a total bound on the depth of quantum circuits. Previous works [GLRS16,ASAM18,LPS19]
aim to minimize cost under a tradeoff between circuit depth and a limit on the total number of
qubits needed, say a hypothetical bound MAXDEPTH. Depth limits are not discussed when choosing
a Grover strategy. Since it is somewhat unclear what exact characteristics and features a future
scalable quantum hardware might have, quantum circuit and Grover strategy optimization with
the goal of minimizing different cost metrics under different constraints than MAXDEPTH could be
an interesting avenue for future research.
We have studied key search problems for a single target. In classical cryptanalysis, multi-target
attacks have to be taken into account for assessing the security of cryptographic systems. We
leave the exploration of estimating the cost of quantum multi-target attacks, for example using
the algorithm by Banegas and Bernstein [BB17] under MAXDEPTH (or alternative regimes), as
future work.
Furthermore, the implementation of quantum circuits for cryptanalysis in Q# or another
quantum-focused programming language for concrete cost estimation is a worthwhile exercise to
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NIST Security G-cost for MAXDEPTH
Strength Category source 240 264 296 approximation
1 AES-128
[NIS16] 2130 2106 274 2170/MAXDEPTH
this work 1.07 · 2117 1.07 · 293 ∗1.34 · 283 ≈ 2157/MAXDEPTH
3 AES-192
[NIS16] 2193 2169 2137 2233/MAXDEPTH
this work 1.09 · 2181 1.09 · 2157 1.09 · 2126 ≈ 2221/MAXDEPTH
5 AES-256
[NIS16] 2258 2234 2202 2298/MAXDEPTH
this work 1.39 · 2245 1.39 · 2221 1.39 · 2190 ≈ 2285/MAXDEPTH
Table 12: Comparison of our cost estimate results with NIST’s approximations based on Grassl et
al. [GLRS16]. The column entitled approximation displays the formula used by NIST in [NIS16]
for NIST numbers and a rough approximation that would replace the NIST formula based on our
results. Note that AES-128 under MAXDEPTH = 296 is a special case as the attack does not require
any parallelization and its cost is underestimated by the approximation.
increase confidence in the security of proposed post-quantum schemes. For example, quantum
lattice sieving and enumeration appear to be prime candidates.
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scheme MD r S log2 (SKP) T -D W G-cost T -DW -cost
AES-128 240 1 1.10 · 261 −61.14 1.00 · 240 1.79 · 271 1.98 · 2112 1.79 · 2111
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implementation.
Table 13: Cost estimates for parallel Grover key search against AES under a depth limit MAXDEPTH
with inner parallelization (see §2.3). MD is MAXDEPTH, r is the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs
used in the Grover oracle, S is the number of subsets into which the key space is divided, SKP is
the probability that spurious keys are present in the subset holding the target key, W is the qubit
width of the full circuit, D the full depth, T -D the T-depth, DW -cost uses the full depth and
T -DW -cost the T-depth. After the Grover search is completed, each of the S measured candidate
keys is classically checked against 2 (resp. 2, 3) plaintext-ciphertext pairs for AES-128 (resp. -192,
-256).
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scheme MD r S log2 (SKP) D W G-cost DW -cost
LowMC L1 240 1 1.40 · 280 −80.48 1.00 · 240 1.08 · 291 1.25 · 2123 1.08 · 2131
LowMC L3 240 1 1.83 · 2147 −147.87 1.00 · 240 1.06 · 2159 1.65 · 2190 1.06 · 2199
LowMC L5 240 1 1.08 · 2214 −214.11 1.00 · 240 1.61 · 2225 1.99 · 2256 1.61 · 2265
LowMC L1 264 1 1.40 · 232 −32.48 1.00 · 264 1.08 · 243 1.25 · 299 1.08 · 2107
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LowMC L5 296 1 1.08 · 2102 −102.11 1.00 · 296 1.61 · 2113 1.99 · 2200 1.61 · 2209
(a) The depth cost metric is the full depth D.
scheme MD r S log2 (SKP) T -D W G-cost T -DW -cost
LowMC L1 240 1 1.01 · 258 −58.02 1.00 · 240 1.57 · 268 1.06 · 2112 1.57 · 2108
LowMC L3 240 1 1.12 · 2123 −123.16 1.00 · 240 1.30 · 2134 1.29 · 2178 1.30 · 2174
LowMC L5 240 1 1.79 · 2187 −187.84 1.00 · 240 1.33 · 2199 1.81 · 2243 1.33 · 2239
LowMC L1 264 2 1.01 · 210 −∞ 1.00 · 264 1.57 · 221 1.06 · 289 1.57 · 285
LowMC L3 264 1 1.12 · 275 −75.16 1.00 · 264 1.30 · 286 1.29 · 2154 1.30 · 2150
LowMC L5 264 1 1.79 · 2139 −139.84 1.00 · 264 1.33 · 2151 1.81 · 2219 1.33 · 2215
LowMC L1 296 2 1.00 · 20 −∞ 1.01 · 269 1.55 · 211 1.06 · 284 1.56 · 280
LowMC L3 296 2 1.12 · 211 −∞ 1.00 · 296 1.30 · 223 1.29 · 2123 1.30 · 2119
LowMC L5 296 1 1.79 · 275 −75.84 1.00 · 296 1.33 · 287 1.81 · 2187 1.33 · 2183
(b) The depth cost metric is the T depth T -D only.
Table 14: Cost estimates for parallel Grover key search against LowMC under a depth limit
MAXDEPTH with inner parallelization (see §2.3). MD is MAXDEPTH, r is the number of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs used in the Grover oracle, S is the number of subsets into which the key space is
divided, SKP is the probability that spurious keys are present in the subset holding the target
key, W is the qubit width of the full circuit, D the full depth, T -D the T-depth, DW -cost uses
the full depth and T -DW -cost the T-depth. After the Grover search is completed, each of the S
measured candidate keys is classically checked against 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
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A AES encryption algorithm
In Algorithm 1, we reproduce a simplified view of AES encryption [DR99, § 4.4].
Algorithm 1: AES
Input: m /* message */
Input: k /* key */
1 s← m /* state */
2 ek ← KeyExpansion(k) /* expanded key */
3 s← AddRoundKey(s, k)
4 for i = 1 . . . total rounds− 1 do
5 s← Round(s, ek)
6 c← FinalRound(s, ek) /* ciphertext */
7 return c
B Comparison of in-place AES KeyExpansion vs. naive unrolling
In §4.5, we discuss an in-place design for the KeyExpansion routine in AES. While this clearly
saves width by not requiring ancilla qubits for the expansion, it may look as going against our
design choice of minimising depth. In particular, one may think that a naive design where a
register of enough ancillas is allocated such that the whole key expansion can be performed before
any rounds are run could save in depth, given that it does not need to handle any particular
previous state on the qubits. In Table 15, we report numbers comparing the sizes of our AES
circuits, with the only difference being the naive vs the in-place designs for KeyExpansion, showing
that the latter is shallower (and of course narrower). This is due to being able to perform the
gates for the KeyExpansion in parallel to the gates run during rounds that do not depend on the
output of the new key material. In particular, the S-box computations required to expand the
key can be run in parallel to those executed on the state by ByteSub.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T-depth full depth width
AES-128 (in-place KE) 291150 83116 54400 13600 120 2827 1785
AES-192 (in-place KE) 328612 93160 60928 15232 120 2987 2105
AES-256 (in-place KE) 402878 114778 75072 18768 126 3353 2425
AES-128 (naive KE) 293758 83212 54400 13600 132 2995 3065
AES-192 (naive KE) 331496 93040 60928 15232 132 3113 3577
AES-256 (naive KE) 406176 114718 75072 18768 138 3385 4089
Table 15: Size comparison for AES quantum circuits using “in-place” vs “naive” KeyExpansion
(see §4.5). In both cases, an “in-place” MixColumn circuit is used. We notice that the difference
in width between equivalent circuits corresponds to 4 · 32 · (Nr + 1)− 32 ·Nk qubits, where Nr
(resp. Nk) is the number of AES rounds (resp. words in the AES key), see [DR99].
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C AND gate
In our AES implementation, we use a T-depth 1 circuit for an AND gate which is a combination
of Selinger [Sel13] and Gidney [Gid18], and that was designed by Mathias Soeken . A diagram
can be found in Figure 7.
|a〉
|b〉
|0〉
|0〉
H
T†
T†
T
T
H S
|0〉
|a〉
|b〉
|a · b〉
(a) AND gate.
|a〉
|b〉
|a · b〉 H
S
S
X
S†
|a〉
|b〉
|0〉
(b) AND† gate.
Fig. 7: AND gate design used in our circuit. We notice that in (b), the measurement returns a
classical bit b and leaves the original qubit in the state |b〉.
D Placeholder S-box
As part of our sanity checking of the Q# resource estimator in §4.7, we replaced the AES S-box
with the design in Figure 8, that tries to force all the wires to “synchronize” such that the T
gates between two neighboring S-boxes cannot be partially computed in parallel. Costing the T
depth of the resulting dummy AES operation returns the expected value of 2×# of rounds× d,
where d is the depth of the dummy S-box.
34
|in〉0
|in〉1
|in〉2
|in〉3
|in〉4
|in〉5
|in〉6
|in〉7
|out〉0
|out〉1
|out〉2
|out〉3
|out〉4
|out〉5
|out〉6
|out〉7
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
Repeat d times
Fig. 8: Dummy S-box design, that tries to forcefully avoid non-parallel calls to the S-box to be
partially executed at the same time.
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